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Abstract
This paper reconsiders the effects of volatile growth rates on growth itself. I show that the
underlying endogeneity of government size can hide the net growth effects from volatility.
There exists a positive direct and a negative indirect channel, with the latter operating
through the size of the public sector. Risk-averse citizens respond to volatility either with
precautionary savings (direct effect) or by demanding a stronger public safety net, which
in turn lowers growth (indirect effect). However, the indirect channel is only available if
the political regime allows citizens to determine their desired level of public services. I test
this theory on a balanced panel of 95 countries from 1960 – 2010. The paper reveals the
latent endogeneity of government size in a single growth equation framework and offers a
simultaneous estimation method as an alternative. Results support the existence of both
effects. The direct channel is stronger in autocratic societies, but as a country turns to
democracy the indirect channel dominates. Volatility has a positive net effect on growth in
autocratic nations, but a negative net effect in democratic societies. This finding explains
why previous growth analyses of volatility at times reached contradicting conclusions.
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1 Introduction
As most countries are trying to recover from the Global Financial Crisis of 2007/2008, the
connection between macroeconomic volatility and economic growth has gained even more im-
portance than before, if this was even possible. Latest since Ramey and Ramey (1995) proposed
an intimate relationship between business cycles and growth rates, various sorts of volatility
have been analyzed in this context.1 One can find a variety of results, covering the complete
range of positive, negative, or no effects from volatility on growth.2
This paper suggests two distinct channels in which volatility affects growth on the macroe-
conomic level. Confronted with a volatile economy, risk-averse citizens may consider two main
options to insure themselves: (1) raise precautionary savings or (2) demand a stronger public
safety net from the government. The former effect goes back as far as Mirman (1971) and is
akin to Devereux and Smith (1994), where reduced savings lower growth. The latter channel
implies bigger governments in volatile times (see Rodrik, 1998, which may in turn lower growth
rates in the short run, as resources are being withdrawn from the private sector (see Barro and
Lee, 1994, Barro, 2001, or Afonso and Furceri, 2010).3 Thus, there could be a positive direct
and a negative indirect effect of volatility on growth. In theory, the net effect could then be
ambiguous, as the mechanisms are pulling in opposite directions.
The following pages first show that ignoring the underlying endogeneity of government size,
as well as the role of the political regime, can lead to misleading conclusions. After addressing
the suggested endogeneity of government size in a simultaneous estimation setup, both the
positive direct and the negative indirect effect are highly significant. However, the occurrence
1See for example Devereux and Smith (1994), Ayhan Kose et al. (2005), Norrbin and Pinar Yigit (2005), or
Imbs (2007).
2Do¨pke (2004) provides an excellent discussion of the literature. Some papers confirming Ramey and Ramey
(1995) in suggesting negative growth effects from volatility are Wang and Wen (2011), Furceri (2010), or Badinger
(2010), whereas others (Oikawa, 2010, Canton, 2002, Caporale and McKiernan, 1998, or Devereux and Smith,
1994) find volatility to spur growth. Posch and Wa¨lde (2011) or Dawson and Stephenson (1997) further suggest
that there exists no link at all between output volatility and growth. Finally, other papers (e.g. Aghion et al.,
2010, Imbs, 2007, or Imbs, 2002) argue that volatility and growth could be related in various ways, some of which
could operate in opposite directions.
3Jetter et al. (2013) formalize this idea in the context of labor market choices and wage volatility. Rodrik
(1998) famously introduces the thought that risk-averse citizens demand stronger social safety nets. There is an
extensive discussion surrounding this theory, as Rodrik (1998) first relates openness to trade to uncertainty, which
then in turn raises the demand for public goods by risk-averse citizens. In this chain of arguments, the first link
of openness leading to more volatility is heavily debated. The present paper only builds on the second effect of
volatility causing people to demand more security from the public sector.
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of both effects varies substantially across countries. Especially the second option of demanding
government services relies on the citizen’s option to engage in the political process. Citizens
can only actively influence public goods provision if they have a say in politics. Indeed, the
positive direct effect dominates in autocratic regimes, whereas the negative indirect effect is
absent. Once a country evolves into a democratic society the indirect channel gains importance
and eventually dominates the direct channel. Thus, people eventually seem to choose an increase
in public insurance over precautionary savings as a response to volatility.
This result provides an explanation why previous analyses could not agree on the net effect
of volatility on growth. Depending on the sample at hand, a single estimation framework can
produce positive, negative, or no net effects on growth. One needs to take into account the
political regime and the underlying endogeneity of government size. Both characteristics are
important when evaluating potential consequences from policies affecting the business cycle.
Further, these findings may explain why some papers (most prominently Ramey and Ramey,
1995 and later Martin and Ann Rogers, 2000) find strong negative growth effects of volatility
especially in OECD economies, as these countries are mostly democratic and tend to have bigger
governments. Finally, this result emphasizes the importance of non-linearities in the growth
literature, in this case along the lines of political regime and government size for the effects from
volatility.4
The paper proceeds with section 2 laying out the methodological setup. Section 3 describes
the sample and section 4 presents the empirical findings. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Methodology
As there exists an open-ended list of potential growth determinants, I use two main reference
papers to set up a growth regression framework: the variables from Levine and Renelt (1992) and
more recently Mirestean and Tsangarides (2009). In addition, the empirical analysis includes
country fixed effects and country specific time trends, accounting for the unique characteristics
in terms of history, geography, climate, and development paths of every country.
4Recently, several nonlinearities have been pointed out in the growth literature, such as Reinhart and Rogoff
(2010) considering public debt or Henderson et al. (2012) in the context of financial development. In a related
context, Cohen-Cole et al. (2012) revisit the link between foreign aid and the quality of policy in the recipient
country.
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2.1 OLS Estimation
The empirical section starts by estimating growth in a single-estimation framework for country
i at year t, including the volatility of economic growth:
gri,t = α1 + α2voli,t−1 + α3lngovi,t + α4gri,t−1 + α5Xi,t−1 + α6λi + α7φi,t + δi,t, (1)
where voli,t−1 stands for growth volatility (calculation explained below). Further, lngovi,t repre-
sents government size and gri,t−1 captures the growth rate of the previous year. Xi,t−1 contains
growth determinants suggested by Levine and Renelt (1992) and Mirestean and Tsangarides
(2009). Specifically, Xi,t−1 contains investment (lninv), income (lngdp), population growth
(popgr), life expectancy (lnlife), openness to trade (lnopen), and inflation (lninfl).5 Absent
from the Levine and Renelt data set is only initial human capital, which in a panel setting with
fixed effects and country-specific time trends may lose importance anyways.6 From Mirestean
and Tsangarides (2009), I am not including public debt, as missing data would reduce the sample
by over 85 percent. Finally, λi and φi,t introduce country fixed effects and country-specific time
trends, whereas δi,t stands for the usual error term. In order to address the latent reverse causal-
ity problem of the growth literature, vol and X are lagged by one year, following suggestions by
Temple (1999) and Durlauf et al. (2005) among others.
2.2 Estimating Volatility
A crucial aspect of this analysis is how to calculate volatility. For instance, Ramey and Ramey
(1995) choose the standard deviation of a country’s growth rates over time. However, the
problem of this method is that one is stuck with a single observation per country or at least
fewer observations if one decides to split the sample. Recently, several filters have become
prominent in detrending macroeconomic time series, such as the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter.
For instance, Ravn and Uhlig (2002) state that “...the HP filter has become a standard method
for removing trend movements in the business cycle literature.” Although the filter has been
5Variables starting with ln imply the application of the natural logarithm.
6This goes along with the more practical reason that annual or even frequent data on human capital is difficult
to come by.
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subject to heavy criticism, it “has withstood the test of time and the fire of discussion relatively
well.” Further: “One attraction of the HP filter is that it may be applied to nonstationary time
series (series containing one or more unit roots in their autoregressive representation), a relevant
concern for many macroeconomic and financial time series.”
Thus, I use the HP filter to detrend every country’s growth rate, applying the benchmark
value of λHP = 100 when using annual time series data to adjust for the sensitivity of the trend
portion.7 As I am only using countries for which all growth rates are available from 1960 – 2010,
each time series contains 51 data points. The result from applying the HP filter is an annual
cycle term for each country. As we are interested in business cycles in general, I square this
value to obtain a measurement for the annual volatility component of a country’s growth rate.8
Finally, I divide this value by 100 in order to facilitate comparability in regressions to obtain
voli,t−1.
2.3 3SLS Estimation
After estimating equation 1, the empirical section presents evidence for the inconsistency of a
simultaneous estimation framework, as the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test statistics (see Davidson
and MacKinnon, 2001) confirms the endogeneity of government size. The paper then moves
to a three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimation system, where growth and government size are
determined simultaneously. Specifically, the government size regression takes the following form:
lngovi,t = β1 + β2voli,t−1 + β3gri,t + β4lngovi,t−1 + β5Zi,t−1 + β6λi + β7φi,t + i,t, (2)
where lngovi,t−1 takes into account government size of the previous year and Zi,t−1 is a vector
containing the usual control variables of the literature, as summarized by Shelton (2007). Among
these are income (lngdp), openness to trade (lnopen), and population size (lnpop). As in the
growth regression, I choose lagged explanatory variables, both for consistency and in order to
address potential effects from government size on openness and GDP, for instance. Further,
7For the choice of the HP filter in this context, see for instance Do¨pke (2004) or Mills (2000). Using λHP = 100
for annual time series goes back to Backus and Kehoe (1992) among others. Section 4.4 provides alternatives.
8This procedure follows Jetter et al. (2013).
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using lagged volatility reduces potential issues from reverse causality, as future government size
is unlikely to affect the explanatory variables today.9 In fact, given that the political process
usually takes its time, we might expect a slightly delayed reaction time in general for most
government size determinants.
Both equations 1 and 2 are identified by unique variables. For the growth regression, these
are lagged growth, investment, population growth, inflation, and life expectancy. In the case of
government size, these are lagged government size and total population size. Their suitability
as identifying variables is comfortably validated by F-tests for joint insignificance of the unique
dependent variables in all respective regressions (not displayed). Finally, incorporating the
seemingly unrelated regression equations model (SUR) accounts for potential correlation of the
error terms.
3 Data
All variables are displayed in table 1 and are taken from one of three standard data sources in
macroeconomics: the World Bank Development Indicators, the Penn World Table Version 7.1,
and the Polity IV index. On average, the 95 sample countries had an annual growth rate of
almost 4 percent. Table 2 sorts all sample countries by their average yearly volatility over the
entire time span of 1960 – 2010. We notice that the core European countries, together with
South Africa, Sri Lanka, Australia, Guatemala, and Colombia, had low growth volatility since
1960. Various African (such as Liberia, the Seychelles, or Rwanda) and some Asian economies
(e.g. the Oman) on the other hand experienced many twists and turns.10
Further, figure 1 shows the worldwide average volatility over time and a breakdown by
continents. We notice major spikes in the mid 60s and the late 90s, where the former appears
to be driven by African, Asian, and European economies. In general, Asian countries managed
to tame their business cycles since the mid 1970s, whereas African nations on average continue
to incur strongly volatile periods. Noteworthy is also a comparison between the richest nations,
as cycles generally appear more prevalent in North America with the oil crisis in the early 70s
9See for instance Acemoglu et al. (2003) or Klomp and de Haan (2009) for the argument of institutions in
general influencing volatility.
10See Koren and Tenreyro (2007) for an explanation of why poor countries might have more volatility than rich
ones.
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standing out. Finally, the 2007 global financial crisis is especially visible in the Americas and
Europe, as for the average European country volatility reached its highest level since the mid
60s.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 OLS Results
Table 3 displays the results from the generic growth regression of equation 1, gradually adding
explanatory variables. Column (1) starts with the most basic model, only using volatility and the
growth rate of the previous year as regressors. Columns (2) and (3) add country fixed effects and
country time trends, accounting for the individual characteristics of each country. Specification
(4) adds government size as a regressor, following Barro and Lee (1994) and others. Finally,
(5) and (6) add the growth determinants used by Levine and Renelt (1992) and Mirestean and
Tsangarides (2009).
As for the coefficient of interest, we see only weak evidence for the importance of volatility.
The coefficient on vol is mostly positive, but insignificant in all specifications (although close to
the ten percent significance threshold level in the final specifications). The coefficients on the
other control variables (not displayed) generally confirm the existing opinions in the literature.11
Were one to stop here, the conclusion would be that either the business cycle does not affect
economic growth at all or that there exists a weak positive relationship. A close look reveals
that including government size in column (4) changes the coefficient on volatility remarkably,
suggesting potential problems of endogeneity. In fact, running the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH)
test reveals that the regressions are problematic and government size is endogenous. The sig-
nificance of the F-values, displayed at the bottom of each regression, indicates that OLS is not
consistent.12 I will turn back to the endogeneity problem in section 4.2 by estimating growth
and government size simultaneously.
Table 4 splits the sample in two types of observations: countries with autocratic and demo-
11Investment, life expectancy, and openness to trade have positive and significant effects on growth, whereas
income and inflation (weakly) carry negative growth effects.
12In estimating government size, I include lagged government size, openness to trade, GDP, and population size
(all in logs), following Shelton (2007).
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cratic regimes. I replicate columns (4) – (6) from table 3 once for observations where a polity
score is negative and then for positive polity values. Specifically, I use the polity2 variable,
designed for regression analysis with values ranging from -10 (totally autocratic) to +10 (totally
democratic). Comparing the regression coefficients reveals an interesting difference as volatility
seems to have a strong positive effect in autocratic regimes, but is insignificant in democracies.
In all specifications, the DWH test for endogeneity is strongly significant, pointing out prob-
lems with a single estimation framework. With the intuition of both a direct and an indirect
effect in mind (and the endogeneity of government size confirmed), I now turn to a simultaneous
estimation framework.
4.2 3SLS Results
Table 5 shows regressions from estimating growth and government size simultaneously.13 Columns
(1) and (2) use the entire sample and we notice a remarkable difference to the OLS framework
above. The intuition on the existence of two distinct channels – a positive direct and a nega-
tive indirect effect – is confirmed: volatility is strongly positive and significant in the growth
regression, but it also affects government size positively, which in turn has a negative effect on
growth.
Column (3) then only considers countries, which at the time of observation are marked with
a negative polity score (autocratic regimes). The positive direct effect is strengthened with its
significance level rising to the one percent level and its magnitude increasing by over 50 percent.
However, volatility does not seem to affect government size in autocracies. This result seems
quite intuitive as options to influence the provision and extent of public services is by definition
limited in autocratic regimes.
Column (4) considers democratic regimes with a positive polity score. Results are reversed
as the positive direct effect turns insignificant and reduces to almost a third of its original
magnitude from column (2), whereas volatility raises government size. This provides evidence
of a shift in response to volatility shocks, depending on the political regime: in autocracies
13Similar to the growth regressions, the remaining government size determinants generally confirm the con-
ventional conclusions in the corresponding literature: bigger populations seem to have smaller governments (see
Alesina and Wacziarg, 1998), plus I find mixed evidence for the effect from openness to trade (a relationship
heavily discussed since Rodrik, 1998). These results are not displayed due to lack of space, but available upon
request.
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people seem to use precautionary savings, whereas in democracies people preferably turn to the
government, demanding a more defined provision of public services as an insurance.
One downfall of this analysis is the arbitrary distinction into positive and negative values
of polity. Thus, column (5) uses the entire sample, including an interaction term between
volatility and the polity score in both regressions. We note that the interaction term is negative
and significant in determining growth, but positive and significant in determining government
size. Thus, as the democratic system rises, the direct effect of volatility on growth diminishes,
but the indirect effect gains importance.14 Following the final and most complete specification
of column (5), a one standard deviation of volatility is suggested to lower the growth rate of
GDP by 0.85 percentage points in a country with a perfect polity score of 10.15 On the other
end of the spectrum, a totally autocratic regime (polity score of -10) would enjoy an increase in
the rate of economic growth by 1.08 percentage points.
4.3 Development Over Time and Country Examples
In fact, the results suggest a threshold combination of a country’s polity score and its size of
government over (under) which the net effect of volatility on growth is negative (positive).16
Generally speaking, with more democracy and bigger governments comes a negative net effect
from volatility on growth. Figure 2 provides several snapshots of the sample data, with the
solid line representing the threshold level. We see that over time countries have moved towards
democracies (further up in the graph) and bigger governments (further to the right). Both
developments eventually lead to negative growth effects from volatility, although the impact of
the regime form is substantially stronger than the impact of government size. The graphs show
that countries have started to move towards democratic systems especially since the late 80s.
Figure 2 also displays several sample countries with their combinations of political regime
form and government size over time. On the one extreme, the United States represent a country,
which exclusively received the high score of 10 on the polity scale, translating into negative net
14Including an interaction term of government size with polity in the growth regression did not produce signif-
icant results. Thus, I do not find evidence that the negative effect of government size on growth varies by level of
democracy.
15Calculation: ∆gr = 1.87
[
0.329− 10× 0.074− 1.439(0.012 + 10× 0.002)].
16Calculation: 0.329 − 0.074 × polity − 1.439 × lngov(0.012 + polity × 0.002) = 0, which leads to polity =
0.329−1.439×lngov×0.012
1.439×0.002×lngov+0.074 .
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effects from volatility throughout the entire sample period since 1961. The other extreme is
represented by Oman, one of the most autocratic countries on earth, according to the polity
score. Here, volatility should have exclusively contributed positively to growth. Countries where
we observe both scenarios over time include Spain, Brazil, Thailand, or Ghana.
Using Spain as an example, a closer look at the data suggests that a period of relatively high
volatility in the early 1970s spurred growth, as their polity score was -7 under the dictatorship
of Franco. High volatility in the late 80s and early 90s, as well as in 2009, however had negative
growth effects, as the country was considered a perfect democracy with a score of 10. Similarly,
Brazil seemed to have benefitted from high volatility in the early 80s, but then volatility should
have had negative growth effects in the late 80s, as its political regime changed drastically
towards a democracy around 1985 with the “New Republic.”
4.4 Robustness Checks
This section presents several alternative specifications, addressing the value of λHP in the
Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, the end of sample problem in the application of the HP filter,
and the definition of government size. Table 6 displays the results of replicating the two main
specifications (2) and (5) from table 5 for each robustness check.
First, the benchmark value of λHP = 100 for annual data has been subject to criticism
in the econometrics literature, where most notably Ravn and Uhlig (2002) suggest a value of
λHP = 6.25. Columns (1) and (2) in table 6 show the results when detrending growth rates with
λHP = 6.25. The general implications of the main results are confirmed, as we observe both a
positive direct and negative indirect effect, where the polity score plays the same role as before:
autocracies (democracies) tend to have positive (negative) net effects. Even though signs and
significance levels (mostly) confirm the previous findings, magnitudes are lower, which might be
due to the fact that with smaller λHP comes a smaller penalty for variations in the growth rate,
i.e. the “trend” is given more flexibility.
Second, there exists another criticism of the HP filter: the end of sample problem (see
Watson, 2007). With a balanced sample of 51 observations per country, specifications (3) and
(4) in table 6 re-estimate the simultaneously determined equations, only now cutting off the first
and final five years of the sample. This means that the volatility term is still estimated using
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the entire 51 years per country, but only the 41 years in the middle are used for regressions. A
look at the results reveals no change in significance levels and only minor deviations in terms of
magnitudes.
Finally, specifications (5) and (6) check whether the results are robust to using shares of
government spending and investment in GDP. In the main estimations, I use total government
spending and total investment. We notice that the direct effect remains positive and significant,
yet the indirect effect turns negative and insignificant in column (5). However, including the
interaction with the polity score in column (6) recovers the main result from above. Notice
that switching to shares changes the numerical interpretation of the coefficients associated with
government size.
5 Conclusion
This paper suggests two distinct macroeconomic channels through which volatile growth rates
affect growth in the short run. Assembling singular findings in the respective literatures suggests
a positive direct and a negative indirect effect of volatility on growth. One explanation could
be that risk-averse citizens have two options of responding to volatility: raising precautionary
savings or demanding public services for insurance. The former has a positive direct effect on
growth, whereas in the latter volatility increases the size of the public sector, which in turn has
a negative effect on growth in the short run.
Whether volatility has positive or negative net effects on growth then depends mostly on the
level of democracy, but also (to a lesser degree) on government size. In autocratic regimes, the
indirect channel is closed, as people do not have the political power to determine their desired
level of public services. The more democratic a country, the more likely it is that volatility
carries negative net growth effects. In fact, the empirical estimates suggest that a one standard
deviation of growth volatility may lower (raise) the growth rate by 0.85 (1.08) percentage points
in a perfect democracy (autocracy).
In general, this paper strengthens the argument that business cycles do matter in the growth
context. However, the implementation of policies aimed at limiting or unleashing volatility
should consider both the political regime of a country and the size of its public sector, if one is
10
concerned about economic growth in the short run.
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Figure 2: Net effects from volatility on growth
Notes: x-axis = government size (lngov), y-axis = Polity IV (polity). Values over (under) the
solid line represent observations where volatility (vol) is predicted to have decreased
(increased) economic growth.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Source Description
gr 3.98 5.83 4,750 WDI GDP growth in annual %
vol 0.238 1.87 4,750 own using the Hodrick-Prescott filter
with λHP = 100 for detrending
lngov 21.59 2.35 4,470 WDI ln(GDP ∗ government share/100)
lninv 21.86 2.50 4,668 PWT 7.1 ln(GDP ∗ investment share/100)
lngdp 23.46 2.31 4,750 WDI ln(total GDP in constant 2000 US$)
popgr 0.02 0.022 4,750 PWT 7.1 popt−popt−1popt
lnopen 4.02 0.63 4,530 WDI ln(trade as % of GDP)
lnlife 4.11 0.20 4,671 WDI ln(life expectancy at birth)
lninfl 0.12 0.29 4,750 WDI ln[1 + (annual inflation/100)]
lnpop 15.91 1.85 4,750 WDI ln(total population)
polity 1.73 7.24 4,279 Polity IV variable polity2, ranging from −10
(totally autocratic) to +10 (total
democracy)
volλ=6.25 0.17 1.23 4,750 own using the Hodrick-Prescott filter
with λHP = 6.25 for detrending
g 14.99 6.22 4,470 WDI government share of GDP
inv 21.73 9.76 4,669 PWT 7.1 investment share of GDP
Notes: WDI = World Development Indicators (World Bank). PWT 7.1 = Penn World Table Version 7.1.
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Table 2: Countries by average volatility (hpcyclesq) from 1960 – 2010.
Country Average Volatility Country Average Volatility
Africa Europe
South Africa 0.039 France 0.018
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.061 Norway 0.020
Benin 0.080 Austria 0.024
Burkina Faso 0.092 Belgium 0.026
Senegal 0.126 Spain 0.028
Ghana 0.129 Netherlands 0.030
Central African Republic 0.137 Italy 0.033
Botswana 0.150 Sweden 0.034
Madagascar 0.158 United Kingdom 0.035
Cote d’Ivoire 0.173 Denmark 0.041
Zambia 0.174 Portugal 0.072
Morocco 0.182 Greece 0.073
Kenya 0.182 Finland 0.073
Cameroon 0.210 Luxembourg 0.091
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.232 Iceland 0.123
Congo, Rep. 0.242 Hungary 0.282
Malawi 0.246
Sudan 0.249 Oceania
Burundi 0.272 Australia 0.025
Togo 0.295 Papua New Guinea 0.149
Niger 0.298 Fiji 0.176
Zimbabwe 0.327 North America
Mauritania 0.335 Canada 0.032
Sierra Leone 0.339 United States 0.038
Lesotho 0.386 Puerto Rico 0.051
Nigeria 0.414 Honduras 0.080
Algeria 0.531 Mexico 0.095
Chad 0.621 Bermuda 0.105
Gabon 0.774 Trinidad and Tobago 0.112
Rwanda 1.033 Belize 0.129
Seychelles 1.947 Panama 0.132
Liberia 3.112 Dominican Republic 0.238
Asia St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.353
Sri Lanka 0.031 Bahamas, The 0.371
Pakistan 0.042 South America
Japan 0.060 Guatemala 0.031
Philippines 0.065 Colombia 0.034
Nepal 0.066 Costa Rica 0.083
India 0.077 Bolivia 0.087
Israel 0.093 Ecuador 0.087
Korea, Rep. 0.096 El Salvador 0.090
Thailand 0.097 Brazil 0.098
Malaysia 0.099 Paraguay 0.109
Indonesia 0.102 Uruguay 0.154
Bangladesh 0.121 Chile 0.174
Singapore 0.137 Guyana 0.190
Turkey 0.143 Peru 0.199
China 0.354 Venezuela, RB 0.240
Syrian Arab Republic 0.543 Nicaragua 0.267
Oman 1.772 Argentina 0.286
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Table 3: Basic OLS results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: gr
volt−1 0.008 0.029 -0.003 0.585 0.516 0.586
(0.184) (0.180) (0.181) (0.370) (0.361) (0.389)
lngovt−1 -1.514∗∗ 2.678∗∗∗ 1.979∗∗∗
(0.645) (0.624) (0.592)
grt−1 0.313∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.219∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.192∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.040) (0.031) (0.032)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes
Country time trend yes yes yes yes
Control Set Levine and Renelt
(1992)
yes yes
Control Set Mirestean and
Tsangarides (2009)
yes
DWH-test for endogeneity1 62.40∗∗∗ 36.66∗∗∗ 43.59∗∗∗
N 4,655 4,655 4,655 4,386 4,346 4,281
R2 0.100 0.135 0.168 0.219 0.225 0.255
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
Control Set Levine and Renelt (1992): investment (lninvt−1), GDP (lngdpt−1), population growth (popgrt−1).
Control Set Mirestean and Tsangarides (2009): GDP (lngdpt−1), life expectancy (lnlifet−1),
population growth (popgrt−1), openness to trade (lnopent−1), inflation (lninflt−1).
1Testing for the endogeneity of government size, where the government size equation contains lngovi,t−1,
lnopeni,t−1, lngdpi,t−1, lnpopi,t−1, country fixed effects, and country specific time trends.
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Table 4: OLS results, distinguishing by level of democracy/autocracy
polity < 0 polity > 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: gr
volt−1 0.777∗∗ 0.680∗∗ 0.865∗∗ 0.286 0.247 0.259
(0.391) (0.311) (0.344) (0.328) (0.284) (0.287)
lngovt−1 -1.978 3.845∗∗∗ 2.955∗∗∗ -0.915∗ 2.382∗∗∗ 2.222∗∗∗
(1.269) (0.979) (0.877) (0.543) (0.712) (0.704)
grt−1 0.077 0.102∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.238∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.043) (0.045) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Country fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Country time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Control Set Levine and Renelt
(1992)
yes yes yes yes
Control Set Mirestean and
Tsangarides (2009)
yes yes
DWH-test for endogeneity1 39.89∗∗∗ 20.45∗∗∗ 33.20∗∗∗ 48.83∗∗∗ 16.14∗∗∗ 16.50∗∗∗
N 1,692 1,668 1,657 2,612 2,598 2,544
R2 0.265 0.267 0.307 0.279 0.296 0.319
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Control Set Levine and Renelt (1992): investment (lninvt−1), GDP (lngdpt−1), and population growth (popgrt−1).
Control Set Mirestean and Tsangarides (2009): GDP (lngdpt−1), life expectancy (lnlifet−1),
population growth (popgrt−1), openness to trade (lnopent−1), and inflation (lninflt−1).
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Table 5: 3SLS results
Full sample polity <0 polity >0 Full sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: gr
volt−1 0.587∗∗∗ 0.603∗∗∗ 0.897∗∗∗ 0.211 0.329∗∗
(0.100) (0.100) (0.145) (0.177) (0.141)
lngovt -0.929
∗∗ -1.236∗∗∗ -1.623∗ -1.590∗∗ -1.439∗∗∗
(0.438) (0.438) (0.913) (0.630) (0.454)
grt−1 0.173∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.020) (0.016)
volt−1 × polityt−1 -0.074∗∗∗
(0.023)
polityt−1 0.022
(0.022)
Country fixed effects & time trends yes yes yes yes yes
Control Sets Levine and Renelt
(1992) and Mirestean and Tsan-
garides (2009)
yes yes yes yes yes
Dependent Variable: lngov
volt−1 0.006∗∗ 0.006∗∗ -0.001 0.012∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
grt 0.004
∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
lngovt−1 0.868∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗ 0.728∗∗∗ 0.735∗∗∗ 0.792∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.017) (0.013) (0.010)
volt−1 × polityt−1 0.002∗∗
(0.001)
polityt−1 -0.001
(0.001)
Country fixed effects & time trends yes yes yes yes yes
Control Set Shelton (2007) yes yes yes yes
N 4,266 4,266 1,651 2,536 3,974
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Control Set
Levine and Renelt (1992): investment (lninvt−1), GDP (lngdpt−1), and
population growth (popgrt−1). Control Set Mirestean and Tsangarides (2009): GDP
(lngdpt−1), life expectancy (lnlifet−1), population growth (popgrt−1), openness to trade
(lnopent−1), and inflation (lninflt−1). Control Set Shelton (2007): GDP (lngdpt−1),
openness to trade (lnopent−1), and population size (lnpopt−1).
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Table 6: Robustness checks
λHP = 6.25 1965 – 2005 Using shares
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: gr
volt−1 0.008∗∗∗ 0.003 0.725∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗ 0.572∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.108) (0.157) (0.078) (0.139)
lngovt−1 -1.261∗∗∗ -1.484∗∗∗ -2.446∗∗∗ -2.694∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ -0.122∗∗∗
(0.438) (0.455) (0.533) (0.551) (0.029) (0.029)
grt−1 0.167∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016)
volt−1 × polityt−1 -0.001∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.018)
polityt−1 0.043∗∗ 0.053∗∗ 0.032
(0.022) (0.025) (0.022)
Country fixed effects & time trends yes yes yes yes yes yes
Control Sets Levine and Renelt
(1992) and Mirestean and Tsan-
garides (2009)
yes yes yes yes yes yes
Dependent Variable: lngov
volt−1 0.000∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.006∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ -0.050 0.064
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.004) (0.033) (0.055)
grt 0.012
∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ -0.021 0.008
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.024) (0.028)
lngovt−1 0.794∗∗∗ 0.791∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ 0.781∗∗∗ 0.794∗∗∗ 0.795∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.010)
volt−1 × polityt−1 0.000 0.000∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008)
polityt−1 -0.001 -0.001∗ -0.016∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009)
Country fixed effects & time trends yes yes yes yes yes yes
Control Set Shelton (2007) yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 4,266 3,974 3,531 3,314 4,306 4,009
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Control Set Levine and Renelt (1992):
investment, GDP, and population growth. Control Set Mirestean and Tsangarides (2009): GDP, life expectancy,
population growth, openness to trade, and inflation.
Control Set Shelton (2007): GDP, openness to trade, and population size.
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